One of the major problems faced by anomaly based Network Intrusion Detection (NID) systems is the high number of false positives. False positives refer to the false detection of normal behavior as malicious behavior. Artificial Immune Systems (AISs) also fall under the category of anomaly based-NID systems. AIS presented in this paper is as a victim-end filter, consisting of detectors distributed on the network, which distinguishes normal traffic from malicious traffic. In this work, we focus on TCP-SYN flood based Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks. Light Weight Intrusion Detection System (LISYS) provides the basic framework for AIS based NID systems. AISs normally utilize the negative selection algorithm in thymus action to tolerize the detectors to normal traffic so they may not detect normal traffic as malicious traffic. We propose and implement 'extended thymus action' model to improve this characteristic of AIS. Results verify that our model significantly reduces false positives which is a major concern in anomaly-based NID systems.
INTRODUCTION
NID systems can be classified into two major categories namely signature-based NID systems and anomaly-based NID systems. Signature-based NID systems extract signature from traffic and match it to the stored signatures from a pre-existing library. Anomaly-based NID systems store information about normal behavior and detect deviation from this normal behavior. This allows anomaly-based NID systems to detect such innovative attacks whose signatures are not stored in the library. But major problem with such systems is high number of false positives (false alarms).
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ARCHITECTURE AND RESULTS
Hofemyr and Forrest proposed a basic architecture (known as LISYS) to cater for TCP-SYN flood based attacks in [1] . We propose an extension to basic thymus action model which is responsible for tuning of detectors so they may not detect normal traffic as malicious traffic. In extended thymus action, a randomly generated set of detectors is evolved for multiple generations in thymus [2] . Negative selection principle is used to tolerize detectors to normal traffic. Generations, set to a predefined constant, is decremented after every generation. If Generations == 0, and detector still has not developed tolerization for self-data, then the detector undergoes programmed cell death, also known as apoptosis. Otherwise detector fields are mutated randomly and are checked for self-match till Generations == 0 or selfmatch occurs. The number of self-matches converge to zero for Generations 1.
Figure 1: Extended Thymus Action
We compared our approach of extended thymus action to simple thymus action in a well known network simulator OMNeT++. The comparison was done under different attack scenarios with varying degree of malicious activity. The results obtained through extensive experiments clearly demonstrate that the proposed model achieves lower number of false positives in differents attack scenarios as compared to the system not utilizing our model.
